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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

THROUGH: Chief, Eastern European Division

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Operations of Project DTLINEN

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief of Operations, DD/P, dated 7 July 1955

Summary: As Reference Memorandum indicated would be the case, publicity unfavorable to the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Fighting Group Against Inhumanity) (KgU) resulted from the arrest of Stephan. Pressure increased to the point where an investigation of the KgU by the Berlin Senate was threatening. However, meetings which were held with State Secretary Thedieck of the Kaiser Ministry and Berlin Mayor Suhr resulted in any German official backing for such an investigation being dropped. Although all problems relative to the KgU are not as yet resolved, the most critical stage of this affair seems to have passed. We are forwarding this memorandum, summarizing the most recent events in the case, for your information.

1. Beginning about 30 June, a number of West Berlin and West German newspapers printed articles unfavorable to the KgU and Principal Agent Tillich, connecting them with Stephan's alleged "black list" of West German political personalities. This KgU publicity acted as a catalyst and on 7 July the tenor of publicity changed. Certain individuals and newspapers began attacking the KgU and its activities as a whole and demanding the resignation of Tillich, an investigation of the KgU and "other" Berlin resistance organizations, and the institution of "proper official" controls over the KgU. Beyond these attacks reflected in the press, von Dellingshausen of the Kaiser Ministry informed our Bonn liaison officer that it was his personal view that Tillich should resign, or at least suspend himself, from the KgU until all charges against him had been clarified. Von Dellingshausen felt that the brunt of the attack was directed against Tillich personally rather than the KgU as an organization, and that if Tillich were removed pressure on the KgU might be appreciably eased.

2. The German Station and the Berlin Base agreed that the temporary suspension of Tillich would alleviate the present situation. In addition, recognizing that an investigation of the KgU might be proposed in the Berlin Senate on 12 July (the date of the scheduled meeting between the Chief of the German Station and State Secretary Thedieck), the German Station recommended that the Berlin Base, with the assistance of [] if necessary, approach Berlin Mayor Suhr to delay discussion of the KgU in the Senate. It was also proposed that Mayor Suhr be informed that the KgU would welcome an impartial, official investigation, provided that it was clearly understood that sensitive information on the KgU's members living in the Soviet Zone would not be revealed. This Division agreed that the suspension of Tillich,

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at least temporarily, might be required, but it did not feel that it was either prudent or necessary to submit the KgU to an official investigation at this time. This position was based on our firm opinion that as official liaison with the West German government had already been established, any questions which they wished clarified should be referred to and resolved with CIA through proper channels and not by investigations of the CIA-supported organization in question. Furthermore, as there had not been any official German request for such an investigation, we felt that it would be most unwise to be stampeded into such action by press reports alone.

3. After receipt of our views, the Chief of the Berlin Base arranged for Tillich to obtain a temporary leave of absence and, accompanied by [] met with Mayor Suhr on 12 July. The results of this meeting were that Mayor Suhr, while raising a number of questions on the status of the KgU which he said must be resolved, agreed that public discussion of these problems at this time would be playing directly into the hands of the Communists. Therefore, Mayor Suhr agreed, the Berlin Senate would ignore the press attacks and the clamor for an investigation for the time being. However, Mayor Suhr felt that official discussions on the present and future status of the KgU and similar groups should be begun after the Stephan trial was over.

4. On the same day the Chief of the German Station and other CIA officers held a meeting in Bonn with Minister Kaiser and State Secretary Thedieck. The results of this meeting were as follows:

a. The Kaiser Ministry at this time has no desire to assume unilateral or joint direction of any of the CIA-supported Berlin groups.

b. The Kaiser Ministry is in agreement with the broad policy involved in the operations of the KgU and similar groups, but seeks closer policy coordination on types and nature of activities without seeking knowledge of specific details.

c. It was agreed that it was highly desirable to avoid any investigation at this time. In addition Thedieck offered to have the Kaiser Ministry release publicity favorable to the KgU to reassure the public and government and political figures.

5. While full details are still lacking, it now appears clear, as we had strongly suspected, that the West German governmental, political, and press representations in this case did not result because of disfavor with the KgU or its administrative harassment activities per se, but rather are part of a general political maneuver to gain a greater degree of German control over CIA-supported resistance organizations operating out of Berlin. This was further demonstrated on 13 July when Stephan Thomas, the head of the Berlin SPD Ostbuero, strongly implied to our Bonn liaison

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officer that the SPD had dropped the issue of the KGU only temporarily and that it was sure to come up again. Thomas stressed that any "private" (i.e., exclusively CIA-controlled) organization like the KGU which endorses the platform of any one political party (i.e. the CDU) at the expense of another (i.e. the SPD) was certain to be harassed in the future.

6. The need for the formulation of a position on the future status of these organizations which will be clearly understood and acceptable to both the West German government and the SPD is apparent. CIA liaison officers in the field will strive to fully ascertain the views of the responsible German authorities. This desk, in turn, will meanwhile draw up a Headquarters position. These together will form the basis for a future policy discussion between CIA and the West German and West Berlin authorities.

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